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AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REFUSE? PUNISHMENT 
WITHOUT TRIAL IN ITALY AND THE UNITED 
STATES: THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH AND AN 
EFFICIENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
by 
Rachel A. Van Cleave· 
INTRODUCTION 
With the jury's verdict in the O.J. Simpson civil case,l ques-
tions going to the heart of our criminal justice system have sur-
faced. Primarily, such questions ask whether the goal of our 
system is to discover the truth of a particular crime, or rather to 
achieve some form of justice, regardless of whether the truth 
necessarily emerges. Where O.J. Simpson was acquitted by a 
criminal jury,2 but then found civilly liable for the deaths of 
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman, it appears to many 
that the civil trial was the real search for the truth.3 Many com-
mentators question the fairness of a system which requires a 
criminal defendant who has been acquitted to stand trial again 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A. Stanford 
University, 1986; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1989; J.S.M. 
Stanford Law School, 1994. (Copyright 1997). Research for this article was made possible 
by a William J. Fulbright Scholar Grant. Accordingly, I thank Barbara Babcock, Miguel 
Mendez, H.G. Prince, and Eric Wright for their support of my application, and the staff of 
the Rome, Italy Office of International Exchange of Scholars. In addition, Professors 
Giovanni Conso and Tiziana Trevisson Lupacchini were invaluable in their willingness to 
discuss my research, and the library staff of the Italian Constitutional Court was ex-
tremely patient in answering my many questions. I also thank Timothy W. Floyd and 
Charles P. Bubany for helpful comments and suggestions, Wesley Prewitt for research 
assistance, and Joseph Schottland for editorial and other support. I nonetheless assume 
full responsibility for any errors in translation of or citation to Italian sources. 
I See Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC031947, 1997 WL 53038 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 
1997); Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340, 1997 WL 53038 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 
1997); and Brown v. Simpson, No. SC036876, 1997 WL 53038 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 
1997). 
2 People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 
1995). 
3 Akil Reed Amar, A Second Chance at Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at A25. 
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in a civil case or a federal civil rights case.4 Continental observ-
ers are particularly puzzled by these outcomes.5 
Another recent example of this tension between truth and 
fairness is the attempt to reopen the case against James Earl 
Ray who pled guilty to the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
twenty-eight years ago.6 Significantly, the King family has sup-
ported Ray's request for a trial in an effort to determine the 
truth about King's assassination.7 Ray's request adds to the mix 
of tensions regarding the need for plea bargains to further effi-
ciency goals, even though the ability to discover the truth may be 
compromised. 
With such soul-searching occurring in the United States over 
the purposes of the criminal justice system, Italy's recent adop-
tion of an overhauled code of criminal procedure provides a 
unique opportunity for evaluating the tensions within the United 
States system. The 1989 Italian Code of Criminal Procedures 
imported certain aspects of our criminal justice system into 
Italy's civil law tradition. This Article focuses on the trial-avoid-
4 Yale Kamisar, Call it Double Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at A37 (citing 
the O.J. Simpson cases as well as the examples of Lemrick Nelson Jr., who had been 
acquitted of state criminal charges but then later convicted in federal court for violating 
Yankel Rosenbaum's civil rights, and the Los Angeles police officers, Stacey Koons and 
Laurence Powell, who were also acquitted of state criminal charges, but were found guilty 
in federal court of violating Rodney King's civil rights). 
• Robert Siegel, All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 5, 
1997, Transcript No. 97020504-212) ["NPR All Things Considered"] (interview with 
George Fletcher, Professor of Law, Columbia University) (noting that in civil law coun-
tries criminal and civil cases are joined and tried together, the standard of proof is lower 
(preponderance of the evidence), and the same for each. Also noting the prosecutor in a 
civil law jurisdiction may appeal a criminal verdict of not guilty). 
6 On February 20, 1997, a Shelby County Circuit Judge in Tennesse determined 
that there was reason to grant a hearing on the ballistics test of the rifle. See Judge says 
Technology Warrants Testing of Rifle in King Murder, THE COM. APPEAL, Feb. 21, 1997, 
at AI. 
7 Leonard Greene, We Need to Try Ray Now and Let 'Justice Run its Course,' Bos-
TON HERALD, Feb. 26, 1997, at 16; Carl T. Rowan, Ray Deserves a Real Trial, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at 25. 
• CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] (Italy). Enacted on September 22, 1988, by 
Presidential Decree number 447, the code did not go into effect until October 25, 1989. 
Throughout this article it is referred to by 1989, the year it went into effect. 
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ance mechanisms which have been dubbed plea bargaining. Ex-
amining how a civil law country has "translated" trial-avoidance 
mechanisms, thought to be characteristic of the United States 
-adversarial model, can further general understanding of our own 
system, and specific understanding of the practice of plea bar-
gaining. Before considering these devices in detail, a general 
description of the new code is necessary. 
Not long after the adoption of its post-World War II Constitu-
tion,9 Italy became aware of the conflicts between this document 
and the 1930 Code of Criminal Procedure (Codice ROCCO).l0 The 
Rocco Code was a product of fascism and reflective of a tradition-
ally inquisitorial criminal justice system.ll In addition, the 1930 
Code did not include methods for protecting the guarantees of 
individual rights set out in the new constitution. Efforts to re-
form the Rocco Code began as early as 1965, but were not suc-
cessful until the adoption of the 1989 Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. The principal goal of the 1989 Code was to bring Italy's 
criminal justice system in line with "liberal democratic political 
structures."12 In order to fulfill this goal, Italy sought to adopt 
aspects of an "accusatorial" criminal justice system found in 
common law countries such as the United States.13 Many of the 
changes focused on opening up the trial stage, thus eliminating 
elements of secrecy characteristic of inquisitorial systems. For 
9 COSTITUZIONE [Constitution] [COST. (1948)] (Italy). 
10 CODICE Rocco [C.P.P (1930)] (Italy), Royal Decree No. 1939 of Oct. 19, 1930, No. 
251 Gazz. mf., Oct. 26, 1930 ["CODICE Rocco"]. For more information on the 1930 Code, 
see G. LEROY CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 220 (1985); Louis F. Del Duca, An 
Historic Conuergence of Ciuil and Common Law Systems-Italy's New "Aduersarial" 
Criminal Procedure System, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 73, 75·81 (1991). 
II MiIjan Damaska, Euidentiary Barriers to Conuiction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparatiue Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 556 (1973) (describing secrecy 
and torture or coercion as characteristics of "criminal proceedings which prevailed in 
continental European countries from the thirteenth until the first half of the nineteenth 
century"). 
12 Lawrence J. Fassler, Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Aduersarial 
System of Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 
245 (1991). 
'" Law No. 81 of Feb 16, 1987, 1987 Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti della 
Repubblica Italiana [Racc. mf.] I 220, art. 2 (LEGGE DELEGA) (Italy). 
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example, the new Italian Code adopted the principles of "orali-
ty"14 (live testimony) and "publicity"15 of criminal trials, judi-
cial impartiality/6 and the techniques of direct and cross-exami-
nation of witnesses by the parties. 17 In addition, the new code 
imposed greater restrictions on the admission of evidence from 
the prosecutor's dossier at trial. l8 Each of these changes regard-
ing the trial stage have made the trial itself more complicated 
and time-consuming, thus creating the risk of a tremendous 
backlog of criminal cases. 
Along with changes in the trial, the new code effected the 
significant structural change of abolishing the giudice istruttore 
(investigative judge)19 who previously was responsible for inves-
tigating the crime, evaluating the evidence, and rendering a deci-
sion. The 1989 Code instead divides up these functions, allocat-
ing them to different players and to different phases of the crimi-
nal process,20 thus altering the roles of the prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys. These structural changes also threatened to 
slow down the processing of cases. Recognizing these likely ef-
fects, the delegating legislation included alternative methods for 
disposing of cases, to streamline the system, unclog the courts, 
and ensure a speedy disposition of cases.21 However, the devices 
'4 Id., art. 2, directive 2 (adoption of the oral method). 
" C.P.P. art. 471 (providing that trials shall be public; if not, they are null). 
'" C.P.P. arts. 37-44 (providing strict recusal rules to ensure the impartiality of the 
judge). 
'7 C.P.P. art. 498 (providing for direct examination of a witness by the party who 
called the witness, followed by cross-examination by the other party). 
to C.P.P. art. 431 (listing the evidence from the prosecutor's file which will accompa-
nying the judge's decision to bind the case over for trial) & art. 433 (stating that any 
other evidence in the prosecutor's dossier is to be returned to the prosecutor). 
'9 C.P.P. arts. 347-357 (listing the investigative activities of the judicial police), and 
arts. 358-378 (listing the investigative activities of the prosecutor). There is no longer any 
mention of the investigative judge. However, the 1989 Code created the judge presiding 
over the preliminary investigations (giudice per Ie irulagini preliminari) who supervises 
the investigations, decides the appropriateness of preventative detention of the defendant 
before trial, and conducts any preliminary hearings. 
20 Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Coun-
try: The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1211, 1217 (1989). 
2' 81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2, directives 43 & 44 (Italy) (providing for 
"direct trial" and "immediate trial," respectively, skipping the preliminary hearing, pro-
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adopted for disposing of criminal cases without trial have collid-
ed with the deeply rooted goal of ascertaining the truth in a 
criminal case. 
This Article compares the steps taken by Italy and the United 
States22 to reconcile the need for an efficient criminal justice . 
system on the one hand, and the desire to achieve justice or 
discover the truth on the other.23 Plea bargaining in the United 
States has a significant history and has generated a substantial 
amount of literature critical of the device as violative of a crim-
inal defendant's constitutional rights, particularly the right to be 
tried by a jury of one's peers.24 In addition, scholars have criti-
cized the distortive effect of plea bargaining on the roles of the 
prosecutor/5 judge,26 and defense counsel.27 Similarly, the tri-
ceeding directly to trial), directives 45 & 53 (providing for "party-agreed sentence" and 
"abbreviated trial" respectively resolving cases without a trial), directive 46 (providing for 
"proceeding by judicial decree" resolving cases without either a preliminary hearing or a 
trial). 
:!2 See also Jeffrey J. Miller, Plea Bargaining and Its Analogues Under the New Ital-
ian Criminal Procedure Code and in the United States: Towards a New U1!flerstanding of 
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 22 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & POL. 215 (1990) (comparing 
plea bargaining in Italy and the United States to support an argument that the cultural 
aspects of different systems should be included in the traditional definitions of hierarchi-
cal and coordinate models to further understanding of different systems). 
23 Although the practice of rewarding criminal defendants who turn state's evidence 
in the United States and the protection of pentiti in Italy are important examples of offi-
cial concessions in exchange for a defendant's cooperation and collaboration, this article 
will not discuss these practices. Both the United States and Italy treat such instances 
separately from the trial avoidance devices discussed in this article. Accordingly, a de-
tailed examination and comp'arison of these practices is left to another day. 
24 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Tri-
al: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Albert W. 
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Emily Rubin, 
Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigm of Informed 
Consent, 80 VA. L. REV. 1699 (1994). 
2.S See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 50 (1968); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983); Robert Misner, Recasting Prose-
cutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471 (1993). 
26 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976). 
Z7 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE 
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aI-avoidance mechanisms adopted in Italy only eight years ago 
already have raised a number of constitutional concerns over the 
powers, roles, and authorities of the players in the criminal jus-
tice system. More recently, in the United States, plea bargaining 
has raised diametric concerns that the criminal justice system is 
too soft on criminals by allowing those who admit guilt to serve a 
lighter sentence than what they might otherwise deserve.28 
These concerns have resulted in efforts to limit the discretion of 
the prosecutor to engage in plea bargaining.29 In contrast, Italy 
is currently examining ways to broaden the application of trial-
avoidance procedures.3o Analysis of these trial-avoidance mea-
sures in the United States and in Italy reveals a number of pen-
dulum swings in both countries with respect to attitudes con-
cerning the purposes of a criminal justice system, and the beliefs 
regarding the appropriate roles of the players involved. As each 
country begins to move away from its traditional perspective on 
criminal justice-Italy toward a greater use of alternatives to 
trial and more dispersion of powers among criminal justice play-
L.J. 1179 (1975). 
21! See, e.g., PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 491-92 
(5th ed. 1995) (discussing the criticisms of unduly lenient sentences and of inaccurate 
conviction records where the prosecutor has engaged in "charge bargaining," both of 
which "breed cynicism about the degree to which our legal system cares about truth"); 
Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 957 (1989); Misner, supra note 25, at 752 (noting that plea bargaining "has now come 
under attack from those that believe it has resulted in insufficient punishment for offend-
ers"). 
.. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(a) (West 1996) (prohibiting "plea bargaining 
in any case in which the indictment or information charges any serious felony"); State v. 
Hessen, 678 A.2d 1082 (N.J. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of an absolute ban on 
plea bargaining in all drunk driving cases in municipal court); Teresa White Carns & 
John A. Kruse, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310 (1992) 
(discussing the 1975 ban on plea bargaining by Alaska's Attorney General); Robert A. 
Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 
UCLA L. REV. 265 (1987) (regarding an attempted judicial ban on plea bargaining in 
felony prosecutions); Roland Acevedo, Note, Is A Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical 
Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987 
(1995) (examining the Bronx County District Attorney's announcement that there would 
be no bargaining with criminal defendants who had been indicted for felony offenses) . 
• 10 See Disegno di legge, July 14, 1994, n. 440, art. 13 (Italy) (legislation proposed in 
1994, but not enacted, which sought to eliminate the need for prosecutorial consent to 
resolve cases by one of the trial-avoidance procedures). 
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ers, and the United States toward greater consolidation of pow-
ers in the prosecutor-each must grapple with how to resolve the 
resulting tensions and conflicts among the respective roles of the 
participants in the system. 
This Article first describes how accusatory and nonaccusatory 
systems define truth, and how the structures of their systems 
reflect these different definitions of truth. Part II traces trial-
avoidance mechanisms in Italy, both under the 1989 Code, as 
well as a limited first step adopted in 1981. This part discusses 
the tensions these changes created between judges and prose-
cutors in Italy, and provides an in-depth examination of the 
tortuous path by which the Italian Constitutional Court has 
attempted to resolve these conflicts. Part III discusses the extent 
to which Italy's trial-avoidance devices mirror the practice of 
plea bargaining in the United States, the extent to which plea 
bargaining is actually characteristic of an accusatorial system, 
and similar types of tensions between judges and prosecutors 
that exist in the United States. In addition, this part examines 
how recent trends in the United States, such as so-called "Three 
Strikes" laws and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, have af-
fected plea bargaining in the United States, and how these de- . 
velopments counsel that Italy proceed with caution when consid-
ering proposals to broaden their trial-avoidance mechanisms. 
I. THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 
A comparison of the search for truth in accusatory and inquisi-
torial criminal justice systems initially requires a distinction be-
tween two types of "truths"-material truth and formal truth. 
"Truth" in an inquisitorial jurisdiction assumes the existence of a 
"material and absolute" truth, "external to and independent of 
the trial.,,31 This goal of ascertaining "material or substantive 
~I GIUSEPPE DI CHIARA, PROCESSO PENALE E GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE-
ITINERARI 3 (1996). See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparative Law: Its Purposes 
and Possibilities, 27 TEX.lNT'L L.J. 315, 319-20 (1992) ("The goal of the continental inves-
tigation and trial remains to find the 'objective trutb .... ) (reviewing BERNHARD 
GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAw (1990». 
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truth" is in contrast to the "procedural or formal truth" pursued 
in accusatory systems. Procedural truth is the result achieved by 
following formal rules designed to ensure that the process is fair, 
and that individual rights have been protected. Accusatory sys-
tems tend to eschew the feasibility of ascertaining the material 
truth of a case and instead settle for the perhaps more realistic 
goal of achieving "procedural or formal truth." The structural 
differences between accusatory and inquisitorial systems reflect 
this distinction in their philosophies regarding criminal justice 
systems.32 
An accusatorial system places central importance on the trial 
as the means by which the parties present and debate the evi-
dence which they have each discovered. The factfinder, usually a 
jury, has the responsibility of evaluating the evidence and reach-
ing a verdict. Correspondingly, the ideal role of the trial judge is 
non-active and impartial. Along with entrusting such a high 
degree of control over the trial to the parties, accusatorial sys-
tems include complex rules governing procedural and evidentiary 
aspects of the trial, such as placing a high burden on the prose-
cutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,33 and the intri-
cate web of rules surrounding the exclusionary rule.34 Partici-
pants and critics alike acknowledge that these technical rules 
actually may impede the factfinder's ability to ascertain substan-
tive truth in any given case.35 However, this division of respon-
sibility and the formal rules reflect the democratic characteristic 
of establishing checks on the actions of the participants. One 
explanation or justification for this system is that where the 
parties are equally armed and have the opportunity to present 
32 Gherardo Colombo, The New Code of Criminal Procedure, in 5 ITALIAN POLITICS: A 
REVIEW 55, 58 (Filippo Sabetti & Raimondo Catanzaro eds., 1991) . 
• <1 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
". Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states by 
incorporating it through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757 (1994). 
'" Damaska, supra note 11, at 506, 579-80; see also Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Compara-
tive Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 
378 (1976) (arguing that the rules in the United States encourage defendants to remain 
silent, thus depriving the factfinder of evidence from the accused). 
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evidence and arguments, the substantive truth will emerge as a 
result of this dialectic.36 A more realistic explanation may be 
that the complex rules governing trials reflect a recognition of 
the near impossibility of determining the substantive truth. 
Therefore, accusatorial systems place their faith in the adher-
ence by the parties and judges to technical rules to protect the 
fairness of the process and the guarantees of the constitution, 
thus achieving justice, though perhaps not substantive truth.37 
The deference accorded by appellate courts to findings at the 
trial level is consistent with the search for formal or procedural 
truth in an accusatorial system. In part, such deference reflects 
the notion that factual findings include aspects which an appel-
late court is not equipped to evaluate based on the "cold re-
cord.,,38 For example, the factfinders are in the best position to , 
evaluate the live presentation of evidence, particularly witnesses, 
and consider demeanor and other characteristics not present in 
the transcript of the trial. However, this appellate deference also 
reflects the accusatory goal of ensuring formal or procedural 
truth. As long as the reviewing court e~an find that the rules 
were adhered to, it usually will not upset the trial verdict.39 
The different definition of truth in inquisitorial systems like-
wise is reflected in the different structure of the criminal justice 
system. Inquisitorial systems marginalize the importance of the 
trial and the dialectical debate between the parties while 
exhalting the role of the investigative judge in researching, ana-
lyzing, and evaluating the evidence to come to a logical decision 
dictated by such evidence.4o Assigning such an active role to the 
trial judge, and collapsing most of the responsibilities into this 
:16 Luigi Carli, 'Fatto e Verita nell'Ideologia della Riforma e della Controriforma del 
Codice di Procedura Penale: Le Ragioni dei Pratici, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E 
PROCEDURA PENALE 230, 234 (A. Giuffre ed., 1995). 
:r7 Damaska, supra note 11, at 580. 
"0 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the 
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge I Jury Ques-
tion and Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986). 
:19 Id. 
4. Damaska, supra note 11, at 582; see also DI CHIARA, supra note 31, at 4. 
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single player, reflects the philosophy that a trained individual, 
the judge, can perform the mental and logical gymnastics re-
quired to discover the substantive truth.41 Correspondingly, the 
defense attorney and prosecutor have passive roles at both the 
trial and the investigative stages, since they are considered ex-
traneous to the judge's task of logical deduction.42 
The existence of very few evidentiary or procedural rules also 
reflects the inquisitorial goal of determining substantive truth.43 
The investigative judge is required to investigate and consider 
all evidence necessary and relevant to determining the truth, 
and very few evidentiary barriers exist to impede the judge's 
investigation. Moreover, the judge's determination of guilt or 
innocence is not bound by a specific standard or burden of 
pro of. 44 
The structure and powers of appellate courts also reflect the 
inquisitorial goal of determining the substantive or material 
truth. Appellate courts are not limited to considering solely "le-
gal" questions, but have the power to reevaluate the evidence 
and even consider additional evidence that was not considered 
by, or available to, the trial judge. Such superior review, "as a 
matter of course,,,45 substantially sacrifices the independence 
and autonomy of the trial judge, thus furthering the goal of as-
certaining the substantive truth. 
Despite the differences in definitions of truth, and the struc-
tures and methods used to determine truth, accusatory and non-
accusatory systems alike must confront the problems of overbur-
dened criminal justice systems, and institute mechanisms for 
handling these practical problems. Both the United States and 
41 DI CHIARA, supra note 31, at 4. 
42 [d. at 3; see also ERALDO STEFANI, LA DIFESA ATTIVA NEL GruorZIO ABBREVIATO E 
NEL PATTEGGIAMENTO [The Active Defense Attorney in the Abbreviated Trial and in Plea 
Bargaining] 7 (1994). 
.. Damaska, supra note 11, at 564. 
44 See Fassler, supra note 12, at 268; see also NPR All Things Considered, supra note 
5. 
45 MiIjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 
YALE L.J. 480, 525 (1974). 
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Italy recognize the impossibility of trying every criminal case 
according to the complex and time-consuming procedures which, 
by providing greater assurance that the criminal justice system 
will protect individual rights, appear to define a liberal demo-
cratic society. Thus, each country has developed mechanisms for 
screening out, or otherwise disposing of, cases without employing 
the centerpiece of the system. In the United States, nearly 90% 
of all criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargains,46 whereby 
the defendant admits guilt in exchange for some concession by 
the prosecutor such as dropping some of the counts against the 
defendant, reducing the charge to a less severe crime, or making 
a sentencing recommendation to the judge based on the 
defendant's acceptance of responsibility. The practice of plea 
bargaining runs counter to the accusatorial method of determin-
ing truth because, to a large degree, the responsibilities of inves-
tigating, charging, and sentencing are collapsed into one player, 
the prosecutor, reducing the checks on his or her exercise of 
authority. In addition, plea bargaining sacrifices rights funda-
mental to assuring the fairness of the accusatorial process. The 
devices adopted in Italy's 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which this article will discuss in detail, are much more limited 
and grant prosecutors less discretion than that conceded to pros-
ecutors in the United States. 
In developing mechanisms for making their criminal justice 
systems more efficient, both the United States and Italy have 
had to grapple with the conflicts and tensions between the 
search for truth or justice and the goal of efficiency. 
•• u.s. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAM, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 530 (1993) (stating that m 1993, 
88.5% of federal conVIctions were a result of guilty pleas); see also Abraham S. Goldstem, 
Reflections on Two Models: Inqu~sitonal Themes m Amencan Cnmmal Procedure, 26 
STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1974) (explammg that "more than 90% of cnmmal cases are 
never tned; they are concluded by pleas of guilty .. "). These statistics do not distin-
guish between cases resolved solely due to defendant's admiSSion of guilt and those re-
solved by such an admiSSion m exchange for some sort of governmental concessIOn. 
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II. PAITEGGIAMENTO IN ITALy"7 
Prior to the statutory reforms in 1981 and 1989, the method of 
dealing with judicial backlog of criminal cases was for Parlia-
ment occasionally to grant amnesty to entire groups of defen-
dants.48 The 1981 law was a first and tentative step toward a 
formal, statutorily governed trial-avoidance device in Italy. It 
added the word patteggiamento to the vocabulary of Italian crim-
inal attorneys, judges, and legal scholars.49 
A. A Tentative First Step in 1981 
Article 77 of the 1981 law provided50 that, upon request of the 
defendant and consent of the prosecutor, the judge could decide 
that elements exist for applying a sanzione sostitutiva (substitut-
ed sanction)-a form of punishment other than imprison-
ment-such as controlled liberty51 or a monetary fine. 52 Such 
alternative sentences, however, were not available for all types of 
crimes. 53 This modification was designed to unclog the criminal 
courts, which were heavily burdened with petty or less serious 
.7 Patteggiamento is the Italian word for plea bargain. 2 FRANCESCO DE FRANCHIS, 
DIZIONARIO GIURIDICO-ITALIANO-INGLESE [LAW DICTIONARy-ITALIAN-ENGLISH) 1058 
(1996). 
•• William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: 
The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1992). 
•• Modifiche al sistema penale, Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689. 
50 Articles 77-80 were expressly abrogated by article 234 of the legislative decree 
number 271 of July 28, 1989. This legislative decree includes rules for the enactment of 
the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which include rules regarding the coordination of 
the new code with other laws and the transition from the old code to the new one. Legis-
lative Decree, July 28, 1989, No. 271, art. 234. 
•• Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 56. Controlled liberty might be best analogized 
to the use of probation in the United States. The convicted person may not leave his or 
her comune (community or town) of residence without authorization, and must present 
himself or herself at least once a day to the local public safety official. 
52 Id. 
5:, Id. art. 60. Article 60 lists, for example, crimes for which substituted sanctions are 
not permitted, including several forms of bribery, perjury, sale of harmful or spoiled food 
products, and usury. CODICE PENALE [C.P.] arts. 318-322, 371-373, 444, 644, respectively. 
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offenses.54 The defendant had until the opening of trial to re-
quest an alternative sanction, allowing the judge to dispose of 
such cases without a trial. In exchange for requesting a sanzione 
sostitutiva defendants received certain benefits. The defendant 
received a sentence less severe than incarceration. Moreover, the 
1981 law provided that the court could even expunge the crime 
itself.55 
Where the judge granted the defendant's request for sanzione 
sostitutiva, the defendant waived both a trial and the ability to 
appeal other than to the Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassa-
tion).56 This very limited form of rewarding a defendant who 
agreed to waive his constitutional right to be tried57 in exchange 
for a less severe punishment was dubbed patteggiamento.58 Use 
of the term patteggiamento in describing these provisions of the 
1981 law indicates the drafters specifically had in mind the U.S. 
device of plea bargaining.59 However, unlike plea bargaining in 
the United States, the 1981 law involved neither a "plea" nor a 
"bargain." The 1981 law did not require the defendant to admit 
guilt or responsibility, nor could there be even an implicit admis-
sion of guilt where the defendant requested the alternative sanc-
tions set out in article 77.60 Otherwise, the defendant's position 
under the ensuing ordinary procedures might be prejudiced.61 
Specifically, under the pre-1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
judge was required to enter a judgment of acquittal at any stage 
of the proceedings where the judge believed that the defendant 
did not commit the crime or that the defendant was otherwise 
.. See ROSANNA GAMBINI Musso, IL "PLEA BARGAINING" FRA COMMON LAw E CIVIL 
LAw 114 (1985). 
... Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n. 689, art. 77. However, if the defendant had already 
benefitted from this law or had prior sentences for which imprisonment was imposed, the 
defendant was ineligible to request sanzione sostitutiua. [d., art. 80. 
60 [d. art. 77(3) • 
• 7 COST. art. 25, § 1-
r.. See Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gazz. Uff.] Oct. 24, 1988, n. 250, 
supp. ord. 106-7 (Report of the Preliminary Project) (referring to articles 77-85 of the 
1981 law as "so-called patteggiamento"). 
S9 Musso, supra note 54, at 115-16. 
M See id. at 120, 135. 6. [d. at 120. 
432 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11 
not punishable.62 Were the defendant's request for a substituted 
sanction to constitute a confession or an admission of guilt, the 
defendant would be deprived of the possibility of a subsequent 
judicial order of acquittal in cases where the judge had previous-
ly denied the request for a substituted sanction. 
In addition, the provisions of the 1981 law involved very little 
actual "bargaining," and no' bargaining between the parties. 
Rather, the law set out the circumstances in which a criminal 
defendant might be rewarded for waiving the right to be pre-
sumed innocent,63 to present a defense,64 and to be tried by a 
judge.65 While the 1981 law required the prosecutor's consent, 
there was no requirement that the defendant and the prosecutor 
come to an agreement as to the alternative sanction. Rather, use 
of the procedure depended entirely upon the initiative of the 
defendant. 
Other than that stemming from the prospect of ultimately 
being convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, there was little 
pressure on the defendant to request the statutorily provided 
alternative sanctions. Under the terms of the statute, the prose-
cutor was involved only to grant or withhold consent to the 
defendant's request. In addition, given the narrow confines of 
prosecutorial discretion in charging, a prosecutor could do little 
to encourage the defendant to invoke the statute. Despite the 
slight resemblance to plea bargaining in the United States, the 
1981 law is important because it required the Italian judiciary, 
primarily the Constitutional Court, to begin to grapple with 
profound issues in reconciling the traditional philosophy of dis-
covering truth with the goal of promoting judicial efficiency. 
"t CODICE Rocco art. 152, para. 2 (currently C.P.P. art. 129). 
6.1 COST. art. 27, § 2 (stating that a defendant is not considered guilty until a judg-
ment of conviction is final). 
•• COST. art. 24, § 2 (stating that the right of defense is inviolable at every phase and 
stage of the proceedings) . 
.. , COST. art. 25, § 1 (stating that no one may be denied the right to be tried by a 
natural and lawfully appointed judge). 
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In a 1984 judgment, the Italian Constitutional Court consid-
ered challenges to the 1981 law which primarily questioned the 
effect of the law on the roles of the judge and prosecutor.66 One 
such argument focused on the fact that article 77 of the 1981 law 
provided that the judge might impose alternative sanctions at 
the request of the defendant and with the consent of the prosecu-
tor. Where the prosecutor refused to agree to the defendant's re-
quest, the prosecutor effectively had veto power over the judge's 
ability to grant the defendant's request, thus exorbitantly elevat-
ing the role of the prosecutor. This, argued the lower COurtS,67 
implicated three provisions of the Italian Constitution. First, ar-
ticle three requires equal treatment of, or parity between, the 
public prosecutor and the defendant.68 The law's provision that 
the prosecutor's lack of consent required the judge to deny the 
request resulted in an unjustifiable disparity of treatment be-
tween the prosecutor and the defendant. Second, article 101 of 
the constitution provides that "[j]udges are subject only to the 
laws.,,69 The binding nature of the prosecutor's refusal to con-
sent to the defendant's request for substituted sanctions made 
the judge subject to the prosecutor's decision, rather than to the 
law. This discretionary decision by the prosecutor intruded on 
the trial judge's autonomy. In addition, the veto power which the 
prosecutor had under the law arguably violated article 102 of the 
constitution which states that "[t]he judicial function will be 
exercised by regular judges . . . ,,70 because the lack of consent 
by the prosecutor amounts to a judicial decision. This aspect of 
the 1981 law required a closer look at the roles of the prosecutor 
66 Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.], Apr. 30, 1984, n.120, 1984 Foro Italiano [Foro 
It.] I 1171. 
67 In Italy, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court includes review of laws for le-
gality. COST. art. 134, § 2. However, only lower court judges may raise constitutional 
questions before the Constitutional Court. While parties might suggest constitutional 
questions, they may not invoke the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on their own. 
See MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 77-79 (1967) . 
... "All citizens have equal social standing and are equal before the law, without 
distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, or social and personal condi-
tions." CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 67, at 281 (quoting COST. art 3, § 1). 
6.. COST. art. 101, § 2. 
70 COST. art. 102, § 1. 
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and the judge, a task further complicated by the fact that both 
prosecutors and judges are considered magistrati (magistrates), 
and thus have the same education and career paths, as well as 
overlapping functions.71 
Italy's Corte Costituzionale (Constitutional Court) rejected each 
of the arguments set out above.72 In upholding the challenged 
provisions of the 1981 law, the Constitutional Court examined 
the role of the prosecutor and the effect of the prosecutor's deci-
sion not to concur in the defendant's request. The court conclud-
ed that the prosecutor's decision in response to the defendant's 
request is not equivalent to a sentence disposing of the case.73 
That is, the prosecutor does not usurp the judicial function of 
deciding the case by withholding consent. Rather, the action of 
the prosecutor represents a mere choice as to the procedural 
mechanism used to dispose of the case. Where the prosecutor 
consents, the prosecutor has opted to dispose of the case without 
a trial and subject the defendant to one of the alternative sanc-
tions rather than imprisonment. If the prosecutor withholds con-
sent, the case proceeds under ordinary procedures in which the 
defendant will have the opportunity to present arguments in his 
or her favor, and the judge will then reach a decision on the 
charges and the punishment, which could, despite the 
prosecutor's dissent, consist of an alternative sanction.74 Thus, 
71 The term magistrati includes both judges and prosecutors. DIZIONARIO 
GIURIDICO-ITALlANo-INGLESE, supra note 47, at 953-954. See also COST. arts. 104-107 
(regarding the formation of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura (Superior Council 
of Magistrates), which is responsible for the discipline of both judges and prosecutors); 
Ottavio Campanella, The Italian Legal Profession, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 59, 83-84 (1994). 
7l Corte cost., Apr. 30, 1984, n.120, 1984 Foro. It. 11171. 
73 Id. 
7. The specific statutory interpretation employed by the Constitutional Court cen-
tered on article 79 of the 1981 law which stated that the judge could proceed according to 
the elements under article 77 at any point in the trial where the defendant has requested 
an alternative sanction as outlined in article 77. Article 77 speaks of a defendant's re-
quest before the opening of the trial and requires the consent of the prosecutor. In deter-
mining that this requirement ofprosecutorial consent did not violate the constitution, the 
court looked to article 79, and concluded that the intial lack of consent by the prosecutor 
ultimately would not preclude the judge from imposing an alternative sentence where the 
defendant had made the request before trial. Furthermore, the lack of prosecutorial con-
sent did not constitute a prosecutorial "veto" depriving the defendant of the benefits of 
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the prosecutor's decision to withhold consent would not deprive 
the defendant of the opportunity to obtain an alternative sen-
tence upon conclusion of the ordinary proceedings. The 
prosecutor's lack of consent only precludes use of the procedure 
set out under the 1981 law of disposing of certain cases without 
a trial. The Constitutional Court also indicated an unwillingness 
to force a prosecutor to proceed with a case in a certain way by 
speaking of the prosecutor's prerogative as to the procedure used 
to dispose of the case.75 Certainly, this hesitation to force a pro-
cedure on a prosecutor contributed to the law's relative ineffec-
tiveness in achieving its goal of unclogging the criminal justice 
system. When a judge disagrees with the prosecutor, the judge 
might impose the ·alternative sentence after the ordinary proce-
dure had been followed, but neither the statute nor the Constitu-
tional Court's decision permitted a judge to disregard the 
prosecutor's wishes and simply dispose of the case without the 
ordinary procedure. Nor did the law provide for trial court or 
appellate review of the prosecutor's refusal to consent. A convinc-
ing explanation for this reluctance to force a procedure on the 
prosecutor is that both prosecutors and judges are part of the 
judicial organ in Italy.76 There is no hierarchy of judges and 
public prosecutors.77 Therefore, if the prosecutor has decided 
that a criminal case should proceed under the ordinary proce-
dures, this decision is to be respected as one made by an impar-
tial and autonomous member of the judiciary.78 This is espe-
cially true since before the 1989 Code the functions of the prose-
the 1981 law, because an alternative sentence might ultimately be imposed. Id. 
75 See Musso, supra note 54, at 136. 
76 No single constitutional article expressly states that judges and prosecutors are 
part of the judiciary. Nonetheless, Chapter IV of the constitution, entitled "The Judicia-
ry," includes provisions regarding public prosecutors. COST. Ch. IV. For example, article 
107 outlines the disciplinary function of the Superior Council of Magistrature, and dis-
cusses both judges and prosecutors. COST. art. 107. The chapter covering the judiciary 
also includes article 112 which states that "[t]he duty of prosecution in criminal proceed-
ings pertains to the Public Prosecutor." COST. art. 112. 
77 "Magistrates shall be differentiated only by the diversity of their functions." COST. 
art. 107, §4. See also Musso, supra note 54, at 143. 
7. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 67, at 107; see also Musso, supra note 54, at 
144. 
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cutor and judge were not as clearly separated and distinguished 
as they now are under the new Code. 
The Constitutional Court also rejected the argument of in-
equality between the parties as a result of the prosecutor's refus-
al to consent. Relying on its conclusion that the action of the 
prosecutor did not amount to a judicial function, the court fur-
ther concluded that at trial the judge would objectively evaluate 
the prosecutor's reasons for withholding consent, just as the 
judge would evaluate the defendant's reasons for making the 
request. This analysis thus preserved parity between the par-
ties.79 As to the roles of the prosecutor and judge, the opinion 
seems to tread carefully in an effort to maintain the autonomous 
spheres of each while at the same time avoiding a hierarchical 
ordering of the two roles; neither can act to bind the other. That 
is, the prosecutor's refusal to consent to the defendant's request 
cannot prohibit the judge from imposing alternative sanctions af-
ter the ordinary procedures, and the judge's disagreement with 
the prosecutor cannot force the prosecutor into a procedure 
which prematurely terminates the case. The court's delineation 
of the functions of judges and prosecutors, while convincing, 
unduly insulates the prosecutor's refusal to agree to the alterna-
tive method of disposing of cases at the cost of limiting the effi-
cacy of the 1981 law. 
Aside from the tensions between the prosecutor and judge, the 
1981 law raised other, more practical concerns. Significant is the 
issue of exactly what the law accomplished in terms of stream-
lining the criminal justice system and unclogging the courts. On 
the face of the law, it appears that the ordinary procedure of 
disposing of cases is not necessary where the prosecutor agrees 
to the defendant's request for a substituted sanction and the 
judge grants the application. To evaluate the quantity of judicial 
resources saved under this early form of trial avoidance, one 
must examine what constituted the ordinary procedure. As dis-
cussed earlier, the Rocco Code of 1930 provided for a public triaL 
'" Corte cost., Apr. 30, 1984, n.120, 1984 Foro. It. I 1171. 
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Nonetheless, given the concentration of investigative and dis-
positive powers in the figure of the giudice istruttore, investiga-
tive judge, the trial became a mere formality during which, at 
most, the defendant made a statement and the court heard argu-
ments by the defense attorney and prosecutor. The judge relied 
almost exclusively on the evidence collected during the investiga-
tive stages.so Therefore, the 1981 law's mechanism to avoid the 
ordinary procedure or trial did not save a significant amount of 
judicial resources since the trial was a mere formality to confirm 
the results of the prior investigation. The 1981 law does not 
provide for the application of the alternative sanctions automati-
cally upon the defendant's request and the prosecutor's consent. 
Rather, the judge must determine the appropriateness of such 
sanctions. Article 77 states that where the judge believes, based 
on an examination of the record that elements exist for applying 
one of the substituted sanctions, the judge may order such a 
sentence upon the request of the defendant and the consent of 
the prosecutor.S l The vagueness of this language raises addi-
tional questions concerning the conflict between the goal of un-
covering the truth and the goal of achieving efficiency through 
trial-avoidance measures. This language does not clearly state 
what role the judge has when the defendant and the prosecutor 
agree to the imposition of an alternative sanction. On the one 
hand, the judge might be in the position of merely ratifying the 
request of the parties, a rubber-stamping role, as long as the 
type of crime involved is not one listed in article 60 as one to 
which no substituted sanction applies. On the other hand, the 
law might require the judge to assess and evaluate the facts in-
volved. The first interpretation amounts to a substantial abdica-
tion of the judge's role of dominating the procedure. However, 
such an abdication of judicial power in this narrow setting may 
be what is necessary to achieve greater efficiency in the process-
ing of criminal cases. If, instead, the correct interpretation of 
this vague language is that the judge must conduct some degree 
"" See PiZZI & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 4. 
HI Le LeggI, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 77. 
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of assessment of the joint request, the next question is what 
level of assessment or evaluation is necessary? 
The 1981 law does not expressly require that the judge make a 
determination of the defendant's responsibility or guilt. Argu-
ably, however, the Italian Constitution requires a determination 
of guilt before imposing punishment.82 The response to this ar-
gument is that the constitutional provision requires a determina-
tion of guilt only before imposing the punishment of imprison-
ment. Application of the alternative sanctions does not require 
such a judgment because imprisonment is never imposed. Implic-
itly, this appears to be how the Italian legislature resolved this 
potential constitutional problem. 
Under another article of the 1981 law, after a defendant is 
convicted, the judge may decide that an alternative, non-incar-
ceration sentence is appropriate.83 The judge may also impose a 
punishment called "semi-detention."84 This form of punishment 
is permitted only where the defendant has been found guilty of 
criminal activity, and the punishment is not listed as an alterna-
tive punishment where the defendant requests a substituted 
sanction before the opening of the trial. It thus appears that the 
legislature recognized the potential problem of depriving a per-
son ofliberty, even if only ten hours a day, where there has been 
no finding of guilt. 
Nonetheless, some standard must apply to the judge's decision 
whether to accept the request of the parties, even if the constitu-
tion does not require a finding of guilt for imposition of one of 
the substituted sanctions. The penultimate paragraph of article 
77 states that the provisions of the first section of the 1981 law 
"2 COST. art. 13 ("There shall be no form of detention ... nor any other restriction 
whatsoever of personal liberty except by a decision, wherein the reasons are stated .. . n). 
.... Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 53. 
... Id. A sentence of semi-detention requires the defendant to spend at least ten hours 
each day confined in a type of institute as defined by another law. In addition, semi-de-
tention includes other provisions that prohibit the convict from possessing weapons, sus-
pend his driver's license, and confiscate his passport. Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 
55. The closest U.S. analogue to Italy's semi-detention would probably be the work-re-
lease programs in some states. 
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are to be followed in the determination and application of a sub-
stituted sanction.85 The first section referred to in article 77 
includes articles 53-76 and concerns the application of substitut-
ed sanctions where a defendant has been convicted, thus assum-
ing a finding of guilt. Reference to articles 53-76 may provide a 
judge operating under article 77 with some guidelines as to 
whether an alternative sanction is appropriate.86 However, it 
will not help a judge determine the extent to which a finding of 
guilt is necessary. Therefore, the incorporation of these earlier 
articles still leaves a gap between the defendant's request, along 
with the prosecutor's consent, and the judge's final decision to 
grant the defendant's request. One commentator has surmised 
that the problems ansing out of the 1981 law are due to a lack of 
clarity in distinguishing between decriminalizing certain offenses 
and creating alternative procedures for disposing of some of-
fenses.87 Eliminating the punishment of imprisonment is a form 
of decriminalization, and the arguably nonpenal sanctions which 
the judge may impose do not require a determination of the 
defendant's guilt. If instead, article 77 merely creates a different 
procedure as to some crimes, while still remaining within the 
criminal realm, then the procedure must end with a judgment as 
to the crimes charged, thus requiring the judge to evaluate the 
evidence. 
Although this is a significant, albeit tentative, step toward 
disposing of some cases without trial, very few defendants re-
quested to proceed under the provisions of article 77. One expla-
nation for this may be that defendants preferred to proceed un-
der the ordinary mechanisms and hope that if convicted their 
sentence would be suspended.88 A suspended sentence was not 
listed as a substitute sanction available under the 1981 law. 
Rather, a suspended sentence was available only upon convic-
tion, and since a disposition of the crime under the 1981 law did 
M Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689, art. 77(2) . 
... See Musso, supra note 54, at 127. 
'7 [d. at 134. 
M Sergio Sottani, Osservazioni Critiche sui Nuovo Patteggiamento, in QUESTJONI 
NUOVE DI PROCEDURA PENALE: I GIUDIZI SEMPLIFICATI 119, 123 (A. Gaito ed., 1989). 
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not involve a conviction, the judge was unable to grant a sus-
pended sentence. Thus, by its own terms, the 1981 law limited 
the extent to which cases might be disposed of without trial, and 
by its ambiguities further limited the possibility of effectively 
unclogging the Italian criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the 
1981 law and the Constitutional Court's analysis of it provided a 
starting point for the drafters of the 1989 Code. 
B. Broader Mechanisms Under the 1989 Code 
Unlike the tinkering and ambiguity exemplified in the 1981 
law, the 1989 revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure repre-
sents an overhaul of the system and contains a clearer statement 
of the goals. The legislation delegatint9 to the Italian Govern-
ment the task of drafting a new code of criminal procedure pro-
claims that the new code must put into effect the characteristics 
of an accusatory system, in addition to carrying out the princi-
ples of the Italian Constitution and conforming to international 
conventions ratified by Italy.90 This delegating legislation lists 
105 principles and criteria which the government was to use in 
carrying out these directives. Among these principles is a limited 
form of plea bargaining, set out in directive number forty-five of 
the delegating legislation.91 Directive number fifty-three sketch-
es a second mechanism to dispose of criminal proceedings with-
out a trial.92 Pursuant to the delegating legislation, Book VI of 
Hq Under the Italian Constitution, the Government (the Prime Minister and his cabi-
net) "may not issue any decree having the force of an ordinary law without a mandate 
from [Parliament]." COST. art. 77, para. 1. Thus, the two chambers of parliament, the 
Camera dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) and the Senato (Senate), issue detailed legis-
lation delegating to the Government the task of drafting the specific provisions of the 
proposed law. COST. art. 76. 
!lO 81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2. 
,., [P]rovision that the prosecutor with the consent of the defendant, or the defendant 
with the consent of the prosecutor, may request up until the opening of the trial, that the 
judge apply a substituted sanction where permissible, or a sentence of imprisonment, 
where such a sentence would not exceed two years, after considering all of the circum-
stances and applying the one-third reduction [awarded to the defendant for having 
waived his right to trial]. 
81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2, directive 45. 
"2 [The] power of the judge to pronounce a sentence on the merits during the prelim i-
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the new Italian Code of Criminal Procedure sets out five 
procedimenti speciali (special procedures), two of which permit a 
sentence of imprisonment without a trial as outlined by direc-
tives forty-five and fifty-three, respectively-applicazione della 
pena su richiesta delle parti (application of punishment upon the 
request of the parties, or agreed punishment) and giudizio 
abbreviato (abbreviated or summary trial).93 
The new code does not use language of bargaining to describe 
the devices of agreed punishment and summary trial. However, 
the report of the preliminary project on the new code distinguish-
es the two mechanisms in terms of the subject of the parties' 
bargaining.94 In the preparatory works on the new code mem-
bers of the Camera dei Deputati referred to la pena su richiesta 
as bargaining of punishment, and to giudizio abbreviato as bar-
gaining of procedure, using the Italian word for bargain, 
patteggiamento.95 These labels emphasize the fact that la pena 
su richiesta involves an agreement between the parties as to the 
punishment they would request the judge to impose. Giudizio 
abbreviato, on the other hand, involves the agreement of the 
parties to dispose of the case by a procedure different from a full 
trial. Both mechanisms reward the defendant with a reduction in 
the sentence finally imposed. Nonetheless, despite the fact that 
nary hearing, if the defendant has so requested, the prosecutor has consented to the 
resolution of the proceeding in this way, and the judge believes that he may decide the 
case on the basis of the stato degli atti (the status of the evidence,literally). The resulting 
sentence is to be reduced by one-third. 
81 LEGGE DELEGA, Feb. 16, 1987, art. 2, directive 53. 
"" Giudizio abbreviato is governed by articles 438-443 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, and the provisions on applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti are articles 
444-448. Another procedure which avoids the necessity of a trial is procedimento per 
decreto (a proceeding by penal decree). C.P.P. arts. 459-464. This device permits prosecu-
tors to request the imposition of a monetary fine reduced by one-half. Where the judge 
grants the request, the case is disposed of without either a preliminary hearing or a trial. 
Within fifteen days of the notification of the decree, the defendant may oppose the decree 
by requesting one of the two other trial avoidance procedures, or a procedure called 
giudizio immediato (immediate trial), pursuant to which the case proceeds immediately to 
trial without a preliminary hearing. C.P.P. arts. 453-458. 
.. Relazione al progetto preliminare, Gazz. Uff., Oct. 24, 1988, n.250, supp. ord. n.2, 
104. 
95 [d. 
442 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [VoL 11 
the legislature, judges, and attorneys use the Italian term for 
plea bargaining, the mechanisms under the new code, similar to 
the 1981 law, do not require a defendant to admit guilt and 
provide little opportunity for bargaining. 
The main purpose of each of these provisions is to streamline 
criminal justice and unclog the courts by providing methods by 
which some cases might be resolved without the necessity of a 
triaL However, each of these devices also raises conflicts with 
the traditional search for substantive truth, as manifested by the 
tensions created among the roles of the participants involved. 
1. Party-Agreed Sentence96 
Application of punishment upon request of the parties is the 
literal translation of the title of this section of the 1989 Code of 
Criminal Procedure. However, Italian scholars, attorneys, prose-
cutors, and judges use the short-hand term patteggiamento (plea 
bargain). In considering how to carry out directive forty-five of 
the delegating legislation, the government looked to the device 
set out in the 1981 law and sought to clarify vague aspects as 
well as to broaden the scope of this form of plea bargaining.97 
Where the 1981 law limited the application of punishment 
without trial only to a form of probation or the payment of a 
monetary fine,98 the 198 Code provides that either the defen-
dant or the prosecutor may request the imposition of a substi-
tuted sanction, if otherwise permissible, or a sentence of impris-
onment, reduced by one-third, or a combination of substituted 
sanctions and imprisonment.99 
Moreover, article 445 of the 1989 Code provides that the sen-
tence imposed upon request of the parties is equivalent to a 
conviction,lOO thus allowing the judge to suspend the sentence. 
<J6 c.P.P. arts. 444-44B . 
• , Report of the Preliminary Project, supra note 57, at 106-0B. 
"" C.P.P. art. 444 . 
• " [d. 
1U0 C.P.P. art. 445. 
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In fact, the defendant might condition the request to the judge 
upon the granting of a suspended sentence, such that where the 
judge denies the condition of suspension, the judge must deny 
the entire request of the parties. 
While the 1981 law listed the types of crimes for which a sub-
stituted sentence could not be imposed, the 1989 Code limits the 
application of the section based on the length of the sentence 
finally imposed. The code provides that the defendant and the 
prosecutor may request the application of a sentence of imprison-
ment where, considering all of the circumstances and the one-
third reduction provided by article 444, the final punishment 
would not exceed two years.10l By so limiting the use of the de-
vice, the new code adds flexibility to this trial-avoidance mea-
sure. The 1989 code also gives the defendant and the prosecutor 
the ability to play with the sentence where the crime involved 
specifies a minimum and maximum sentence, rather than a fixed 
sentence.102 In addition, it permits the parties to agree on the 
existence of extenuating circumstances under the penal code,103 
resulting in a further reduction of the ultimate sentence, even 
before the statutorily prescribed one-third reduction is applied 
under article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.l04 
For example, take the crime of receipt of stolen goods, set out 
in article 648 of the Penal Code.lo5 The first paragraph of arti-
cle 648 imposes a sentence of imprisonment from two to eight 
years, and a monetary fine of one to twenty million lire. 106 
However, the next paragraph provides that for cases involving 
101 C.P.P. art. 444. 
102 For example, the crime of producing or trafficking illicit drugs is punishable by 
eight to twenty years imprisonment. Le Leggi, Dec. 22, 1975, n.685, art. 71(1). 
10:1 C.P. arts. 62-70. 
104 One commentator has argued that the one-third reduction granted under giudizio 
abbreuiato effectively permits a modification of articles 63 et seq. of the Penal Code. 
Ernesto Lupo, Il Giudizio Abbreuiato e L'applicazione della Pena Negoziata, in QUESTIONI 
NUOVE DI PROCEDURA PENALE: I GIUDIZI SEMPLIFICATI 61, 70 (A. Gaito ed., 1989). The 
same critique applies to applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti. 
10.' C.P. art. 648. 
106 Assuming an exchange rate of 1500 lire to the dollar, this is about $666.00 to 
$13,333.00. 
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less serious facts, the punishment shall only be imprisonment up 
to six years, and a fine of up to one million lire. 107 This para-
graph does not indicate what factors make a case of stolen goods 
less serious, nor does the provision state a minimum sentence. 
Thus, upon agreeing that the particular case is less serious, the 
prosecutor and the defense attorney could begin with a base sen-
tence of one year. The parties could then agree that the defen-
dant is entitled to a reduction of one-third, based on "generic" ex-
tenuating circumstances under the penal code. lOB Finally, given 
the decision of the defendant to opt for this procedure, the sen-
tence would be reduced by another one-third.109 In this exam-
ple, the defendant could end up with a final sentence of six 
months.1l0 Thus, depending on the type of sentence statutorily 
assigned to a particular crime, the applicazione della pena su 
richiesta delle parti provides the parties with a great deal of 
flexibility in reaching a final sentence of less than two years 
which they will request of the judge. 
This example also illustrates another difference between the 
1981 law and article 444 of the 1989 code. Under the 1981 law, 
initiation of the procedure depended upon the defendant's re-
quest, which did not include any discussion with the prosecutor. 
In contrast, the applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti 
involves a joint request based on an agreement of the parties as 
to the nature of the crime as well as the length and type of pun-
ishment. When the parties put the request to the judge, they 
have already agreed upon how to characterize the crime in-
1111 c.P. art. 648(2). 
If~ C.P. art. 65(3). 
109 C.P.P. art. 444. 
110 This example is based on a case which the author observed in the Pretura of Rome 
on September 18, 1996. In this case the amount involved was eighteen million lire. Typi-
cally, amounts over ten million lire are not considered to be less serious cases entitled to 
the sentence set out in paragraph two of article 648 of the Penal Code (according to a 
conversation with defense attorney Maurizio Bellacosa, Sept. 18, 1996). However, in this 
case, the prosecutor agreed to treat the case under the second paragraph, thus avoiding 
the minimum two-year sentence, but told the defense attorney that the final agreed-upon 
sentence would have to be six months. The two then worked to reach the result indicated 
in the text accompanying this footnote. The judge approved the sentence requested by the 
parties. 
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volved-as in the above example where the parties agreed that 
the case of receipt of stolen property was of a less severe na-
ture-in addition to having agreed upon the final sentence. Com-
mentators have noted that this marked increase in the parties' 
control over criminal proceedings is consistent with the delegat-
ing legislation's directive of adopting accusatorial characteristics 
in the new Code of Criminal Procedure.1l1 However, it is pre-
cisely this increase in the powers of the defendant and the prose-
cutor that has conflicted with several constitutional norms defin-
ing the roles of the participants in the criminal justice system. 
In contrast to the 1981 law, article 444 of the new code in-
cludes some express standards by which the judge is to evaluate 
the request of the parties. However, the absence of certain stan-
dards has led to constitutional challenges. Article 444 states that 
the judge is to determine whether the parties have proposed the 
correct legal qualification or definition of the crime and whether 
they have accurately applied and balanced the circumstances in-
volved to reach an appropriate punishment.1l2 Thus, in the 
above example of receipt of stolen goods, the judge must initially 
evaluate whether the parties correctly qualified the crime as less 
serious under paragraph two of article 648 of the penal code, 
thus avoiding the mandatory minimum sentence. Further, the 
judge must assess whether the parties correctly applied the re-
duction for generic extenuating circumstances, under article 
65(3) of the penal code. However, articles 444-448 are silent as to 
the judge's power to evaluate a sentence in an individual case for 
proportionality, a discretionary power expressly given to the , 
III See, e.g., MARIO CHIAVARIO, PROCEDURA PENALE: UN CODICE TRA "STORIA" E 
CRONACA 119-20 (1996); Lupo, supra note 104, at 81; GIOVANNI PAOLOZZI, IL GIUDIZIO 
ABBREVIATO 17 (1991); STEFANI, supra note 42, at 5-6. But see ANIELLO NAPPI, GUIDA AL 
Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 343-44 (3rd ed. 1992) (characterizing bothgiudizio 
abbreviato and la pena su richiesta delle parti as examples of the inquisitorial method); 
Giuliano VassaIli, La Giustizia Penale Statunitense e la Riforma del Processo Penale 
Italiano, in PROCESSO PENALE NEGLI STATI UNITI 251, 259 (E. Amodio et aI. eds., 1988) 
(arguing that plea bargaining in Italy is needed as a practical matter to relieve the other-
wise impossible burden on the justice system, not because it is a grand procedural princi-
ple representative of an accusatorial system). 
112 C.P.P. art. 444(2). 
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judge under articles 132 and 133 of the penal code.1!3 The argu-
ment is that since this is a power allocated to the judge, the 
procedure set out in article 444, which allocates the selection of 
the sentence to the agreement of the parties, violates the consti-
tutional provision which states that "[j]udges are subject only to 
the law."u4 
In one of two orders considered jointly by the Constitutional 
Court in 1990,115 the defendant had been charged with the pro-
duction and trafficking of illicit drugs. 116 The prosecutor and 
the defendant presented the judge with an agreed-upon sentence 
of one year and six months imprisonment and a fine of two mil-
lion lire, with the sentence to be suspended. The tribunalell7 
argued lIB the unconstitutionality of article 444 to the extent 
that the judge could not consider the adequacy of the sentence 
when compared to the gravity of the offense, even though the 
parties had correctly defined the offense and correctly found the 
existence of extenuating circumstances. The Constitutional Court 
rejected this argument, holding that the constitution says noth-
ing about proportionate sentences. However, the court did find 
that the tribunale implicitly raised a constitutional question to 
the extent that article 444 does not expressly permit the judge to 
consider whether the agreed sentence promoted the constitution-
al goal of rehabilitation of the defendant. 119 In this regard, the 
court found a constitutional violation, thus essentially amending 
the statute to permit such an evaluation by the judge. 120 
"" C.P. art. 133. This provision requires the judge to consider the gravity of the crime, 
as well as the criminal nature of the individual defendant. 
114 COST. art. 101. 
llfi Corte cost., July 2, 1990, n.313, 1990 Foro It. I 2385. 
116 Le Leggi, Dec. 22, 1975, n.685, art. 71. 
117 This is a trial court whose criminal jurisdiction covers crimes punishable by up to 
eight years imprisonment. Campanella, supra note 71, at 68 n.91. 
11M See supra note 66. 
119 The Italian Constitution states that "[p]unishments cannot involve inhumane 
treatment and shall promote the rehabilitation of the convicted person." COST. art. 27, 
para. 3. 
'2" This author's description of the unconstitutionality found by the Constitutional 
Court differs from that of other commentators who mistakenly characterized the finding 
as a violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence. See, e.g., Pizzi & Marafioti, 
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The tribunale also raised the argument that article 444 violat-
ed two other articles of the constitution which set out the judge's 
role and authority.121 The court rejected these arguments, how-
ever, that article 444 relegates the judge's role and power to that 
of a mere notary.122 Although article 102(1) provides that "[t]he 
judicial function will be exercised by regular judges," the 
tribunale argued that article 444 attributes to the judge a role of 
merely reviewing the parties' agreement for legal legitimacy. The 
court explained that the judge's evaluation of the agreement 
between the parties is not simply an exercise in legal logic where 
the judge assesses whether the agreement is covered by the law. 
Rather, article 444 requires the judge to examine and evaluate 
the evidence when drawing his conclusion on the appropriate-
ness of the charge and the punishment. The judge is not bound 
by the agreement of the parties, and a judge who disagrees with 
the parties' determination will simply reject the agreement. 
Additionally, article 444 states that the judge may grant the 
parties' request unless an order of acquittal must be issued un-
der article 129,123 thus requiring the judge to evaluate the mer-
its of the case. 
The argument based on article 102(1) of the Italian Constitu-
tion is closely related to the trial court's challenge based on arti-
cle 111. Article 111 provides, in part, that "[i]n all dispositive 
judicial actions the reasons must be stated. ,,124 The tribunale 
supra note 48, at 34. The provision regarding the presumption of innocence is found in 
article 27 of the Italian Constitution, as is the provision declaring the goal of rehabilita-
tion. However, the Constitutional Court expressly rejected the argument that article 444 
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence. Firstly, upon receipt of the request 
of the parties, the judge must determine whether an aquittal is required under article 
129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Secondly, where a defendant requests the applica-
tion of an agreed-upon sentence, he waives his right to dispute the charges. This does not 
violate the presumption of innocence which continues to exist until the sentence becomes 
final. Corte cost., July 2, 1990, n.313, 1990 Foro It. I 2385. 
121 COST. arts. 102(1) and 111(1). 
122 Id. In Italy, the notaio is a category of practicing lawyers, unlike the American 
notary public. Campanella, supra note 71, at 71-72. 
12-1 C.P.P. art. 129. 
124 COST. art. 111(1). In addition, the constitution states that "[t]here shall be no form 
of detention, ... except by a [written] decision, wherein the reasons are stated, of the 
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argued that article 444 permits a judge who approves the 
parties' agreement to state that the sentence is imposed based on 
the accord of the parties and a comparison of the circumstances, 
and thus to simply ratify the parties' will. 125 That is, this sec-
tion of the criminal procedure code does not require the judge to 
explain his reason for finding that the sentence is legally justi-
fied, apart from the agreement of the parties; therefore, article 
444 violates the constitutional requirement of a written justifica-
tion. The Constitutional Court held that in the opinion disposing 
of the case based on the agreement of the parties, a judge must 
include an assessment of the correctness of the juridical defini-
tion of the case, as well as a comparison of the aggravating and 
extenuating circumstances involved. Thus, the Constitutional 
Court confirmed the requirement that the judge issue written 
reasons for the sentence even when the trial court imposes the 
sentence agreed upon by the parties.126 However, the court's 
holding is difficult to reconcile with the principle of "libero 
convincimento del giudice", or, the independent and autonomous 
decision of the judge, which has signified the authority of the 
judge to determine both the responsibility and the sentence of a 
criminal defendant, almost from scratch. In contrast, the Consti-
tutional Court's decision indicates that the judge's determination 
begins with and works off of the parties' agreement, either ac-
cepting or rejecting their assessment of the type of crime in-
volved, the balancing of extenuating and aggravating circum-
stances, and the permissibility of suspending the sentence. 
This challenge, regarding the reasoning of the judge, is a poi-
gnant example of the tension created by application of an accusa-
torial system, based on the control of the parties, to a system 
constitutionally defined by the dominion of the judge at trial. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court attempts to adhere to 
judicial authorities." COST. art. 13(2). 
12.' This is essentially what the Corte de Cassazione held. Cass., sez. un., 27 Mar. 
1992. 
126 Article 426 provides, inter alia, that a sentence must contain "a summary state-
ment of the factual and legal reasons upon which the decision is based." C.P.P. art. 
426(1)(d). 
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the constitutional powers of the judge even though article 444 
provides that the judge's assessment works from the agreement 
of the parties as to both the facts and the punishment. In this 
author's opinion, the strong language of th~ Constitutional Court 
in support of the judicial role at trial masks the extent to which 
the agreed upon sentence strips the judge of substantial power. 
For instance, the opinion of the Constitutional Court does not ex-
pressly state the all-or-nothing position of the judge. The judge 
must either accept the agreement of the parties in its entirety, or 
reject it; the judge has no power to modify the request. This 
further confirms the role of the judge, emphatically denied by the 
Constitutional Court, as an entity simply to check the agreement 
of the prosecutor and defendant. 
Another aspect of the patteggiamento device -is the requirement 
of consent by the prosecutor, which the 1981 law also mandated. 
Despite the title of the device-"application of the punishment 
agreed upon by the parties"-the articles governing this device 
provide for the possibility that either party may invoke the pro-
cedure.127 Similar to the trial-avoidance procedure under the 
1981 law, patteggiamento also requires the consent of the prose-
cutor. However, in contrast to the 1981 law (which did not pro-
vide for any review of the prosecutor's withholding of consent), 
the 1989 code expressly provides that, upon completion of the 
trial, if the trial court finds that the prosecutor's withholding of 
consent was not justified, the court may impose the sentence 
originally requested by the defendant. l28 This appears consis-
tent with the 1984 Constitutional Court decision declaring that a 
procedure for disposing of a case could not be forced upon the 
prosecutor, and that the prosecutor's procedural choice could not 
bind the judge's decision as to the appropriate punishment.129 
127 Article 444 refers to the "party who did not formulate the request." c.P.P. art. 
444(2). "If the request is presented by one party [during the preliminary investigations], 
the judge sets by decree a date by which the other part must express agreement or not." 
c.P.P. art. 447(3). 
128 c.P.P. art. 448(1). 
129 Using a similar analysis, the Constitutional Court determined that such a chal-
lenge to article 448 was without basis. Corte cost., Mar. 29, 1993, n.127 (order of the 
court). 
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Thus, it appears that the drafters of the 1989 code were guided 
by the 1984 Constitutional Court decision in providing for judi-
cial review of a prosecutor's dissent and in permitting the defen-
dant to gain the advantage of the sentence reduction upon con-
viction even when the prosecutor withheld consent. The drafters, 
however, did not provide for similar review of a prosecutor's 
withholding of consent to the other trial-avoidance mechanism 
adopted by the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, giudizio 
abbreviato (abbreviated or summary trial). 
2. Abbreviated Trial 
Patteggiamento has been dubbed bargaining as to the punish-
ment, in contrast to giudizio abbreviato (abbreviated or summary 
trial), which is called bargaining as to the procedure. While little 
bargaining occurs under the device of application of the agreed 
upon sentence, no bargaining is involved in giudizio abbreviato. 
Rather, invocation of the procedure depends entirely on the ini-
tiative of the defendant, and requires no discussion with the 
prosecutor, even though the prosecutor's consent is neces-
sary.130 Upon the defendant's request and the prosecutor's con-
sent, the judge must determine whether it is possible to dispose 
of the case allo stato degli atti l31 (based upon the evidence thus 
far accumulated}.132 If the judge determines that it is possible 
to proceed under this mechanism, the case is disposed of at the 
preliminary hearing, with the judge issuing the appropriate sen-
tence.133 Where the judge issues a sentence of conviction, the 
punishment which would otherwise result is reduced by one-
third. 134 Similar to the application of an agreed sentence, the 
incentive for a defendant to invoke this summary procedure is a 
reduction of the sentence if the defendant is ultimately convicted. 
I,m C.P.P. art. 438. 
\.II C.P.P. art. 440(1). 
1"2 This means that the judge is to evaluate the case using the evidence in the 
prosecutor's dossier, and neither party is to present additional evidence. However, a de-
fendant might make a statement. 
IH C.P.P. art. 442. 
114 C.P.P. 442(2). 
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However, unlike application of the agreed upon sentence, which 
is limited to situations where the final sentence does not exceed 
two years, giudizio abbreviato may be requested without regard 
to the final sentence imposed or to the type of crime charged, at 
least as originally enacted.l35 
The "typical" use of giudizio abbreviato occurs where, either 
before or during the preliminary hearing, the defendant requests 
the judge to dispose of the case this way by deciding the merits 
of the case based on the evidence contained in the prosecutor's 
dossier. Use of this procedure will result in a judicial decision on 
the merits of the case in anticipation of trial, in contrast to the 
agreed-upon sentence procedure where the judge simply decides 
whether to accept the agreement of the prosecutor and defendant 
as to the merits of the case and the ultimate sentence to be im-
posed. Thus, the nature of giudizio abbreviato requires active 
participation by the judge on the merits of the case and not sim-
ply an evaluation of the parties' agreement. 
Giudizio abbreviato may be invoked in other situations as well. 
For example, the prosecutor may request that the case proceed 
by one of the mechanisms which bypasses the preliminary hear-
ing-giudizio direttissimo l36 (direct trial), or giudizio 
immediatol37 (immediate trial). Where the judge has granted 
such a request, the defendant may oppose this by requesting 
giudizio abbreviato.l38 Pursuant to both of these procedures, a 
case proceeds to trial on an accelerated basis by avoiding the 
preliminary hearing. A prosecutor may invoke the direct trial 
device where the defendant was arrested in flagrante, or where 
13.' The Constitutional Court determined that the drafters of the 1989 code had ex-
ceeded their legislative mandate by providing that crimes punishable by life imprison-
ment could be disposed of by giudizio abbreviato, resulting in a reduced sentence of 30 
years. Corte cost., Apr. 23, 1991, n.176, 1991 Foro It. I 2318. 
136 C.P.P. arts. 449-452. 
137 C.P.P. arts. 453-458. 
I,.. See C.P.P. art. 452(2) (providing for the transformation of direct trial into abbre-
viated trial upon consent of the prosecutor and judge's decision that he or she may decide 
the case based on the evidence in the prosecutor's dossier). See also C.P.P. art. 458 (pro-
viding that the defendant may request an abbreviated trial in opposition to the 
prosecutor's request of immediate trial). 
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the defendant confessed. 139 Immediate trial applies to situa-
tions where the evidence against the defendant is strong and the 
judge for the preliminary investigations determines that the case 
may be bound over for trial without the need for a preliminary 
hearing. 14o Consistent with the purposes of the trial-avoidance 
devices, giudizio abbreviato and application of an agreed-upon 
sentence, these mechanisms for getting a case to trial faster are 
intended to help unclog the criminal justice system by quickly 
disposing of cases where the proof is relatively straightforward. 
Permitting the defendant to request giudizio abbreviato would 
resolve the cases even more efficiently than these other proce-
dures by disposing of them in the preliminary hearing and avoid-
ing a trial. The incentive for the defendant to make such a re-
quest is the prospect of a one-third sentence reduction in a situa-
tion where proof of guilt would be difficult to counter. Analogous-
ly, in the United States, these types of cases, where the defen-
dant has been caught in the act or where there is otherwise 
strong evidence of guilt, would likely result in a plea bargain 
between the prosecutor and the defendant. 
The above uses of giudizio abbreviato have been dubbed the 
"atypical"141 version of the procedure since the defendant does 
not make the request at the preliminary hearing, but rather in 
opposition to one of the procedures that skip the preliminary 
hearing and move the case straight to trial. 
Despite the description of bargaining as to the procedure, use 
of giudizio abbreviato, in either its typical or atypical version, 
relies exclusively upon the initiative of the defendant; the prose-
cutor may not invoke the procedure. However, the consent of the 
prosecutor is necessary under the law as originally enacted. The 
articles setting out this summary procedurel42 do not expressly 
indicate the effect of a prosecutor's decision to withhold consent 
la" See C.P.P. 449(1) and (5). See also SERGIO RAMAJOLI, I PROCEDIMENTI SPECIALI NEL 
CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 104-05 (2d ed. 1996). 
1111 [d. at 140. 
141 See id. at 130. See also CARMINE COVINE, "PATIEGGIAMENTO" E GIUDIZIO 
ABBREVIATO 125 (1995). 
142 C.P.P. arts. 438-443. 
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to the defendant's request. The report of the drafters of the code 
acknowledges this omission, but explains that this trial avoid-
ance device is one which does not involve the merits of the 
charges. In contrast to application of the agreed-upon sentence, 
where the defendant's request concerns not only the procedure 
used but also the type of crime inyolved and the sentence to be 
imposed, giudizio abbreviato involves only a procedural choice. 
The report also points to the fact that the procedural choice by 
the prosecutor is likely to involve a complex consideration of 
various factors, making it difficult to set out in the abstract how 
such a choice could be examined on review. Finally, the report 
again emphasizes the mere procedural aspect of giudizio 
abbreviato and its usefulness in unclogging the criminal justice 
system to justify the "reward" of the one-third sentence reduction 
for the defendant who requests the procedure. Absent this incen-
tive, the device would be completely useless. Despite the rea-
soning of the drafting committee, the prosecutor's veto power in 
giudizio abbreviato triggered constitutional challenges, similar to 
the challenges made to the 1981 law and to the device of the 
agreed-upon sentence. 
In a series of sentences, the Constitutional Court examined the 
effect of the prosecutor's refusal to consent to the defendant's 
request of giudizio q,bbreviato.l43 In each of the three sentences, 
the Constitutional Court determined that the discipline of 
giudizio abbreviato, as enacted, was unconstitutional to the ex-
tent that it did not require the prosecutor to articulate reasons 
for withholding consent to the defendant's request for the sum-
mary procedure. In addition, the court held that if the subse-
quent trial resulted in a conviction, and the judge determined 
that the prosecutor's reasons for withholding consent were un-
founded, the judge could grant the defendant the one-third sen-
tence reduction. The result of these decisions was to add judicial 
review of the prosecutor's withholding of consent to the proce-
dure of summary trial. Also added was the possibility of a one-
... , See Corte cost., Feb. 8, 1990, n.66, 1990 Foro It. I 738; Corte cost., Apr. 18, 1990, 
n.183; Corte cost., Feb. 15, 1991, n.81, 36 Giur: cost. 559. 
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third sentence reduction where, upon completion of the trial, the 
judge determined that the prosecutor improperly withheld con-
sent to the defendant's request for the abbreviated procedure. In 
addition, the court extended this sentence involving the "typical" 
application of giudizio abbreviato to the "atypical" instances. 
That is, where the defendant requests giudizio abbreviato in 
opposition to one of the procedures by which the case would 
proceed directly to trial, the prosecutor's refusal to consent is 
subject to the same form of judicial review, and the defendant is 
entitled to a one-third sentence reduction upon a judicial deter-
mination that the prosecutor improperly withheld consent. 144 
In the three sentences, the Constitutional Court relied on 
article three of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees equal-
ity.145 In the first of the three sentences,146 the court com-
pared giudizio abbreviato with application of agreed-upon pun-
ishment, and could find no justification for requiring the prose-
cutor to state reasons for his or her dissent to the latter, but not 
the former. The court rejected the distinction made in the pre-
liminary project report, stating that while giudizio abbreviato in-
volves a choice of procedures, and no request or agreement as to 
the nature of the facts or the appropriate punishment, the choice 
has an effect on the sanction imposed, specifically, the one-third 
sentence reduction upon conviction. The court emphasized its 
reasoning in the subsequent sentences, still relying on the equal-
ity provision of the constitution, by delineating two aspects of 
equality violated by the lack of judicial review of the prosecutor's 
refusal to consent to the procedure. 
The first aspect of equality is similar to the challenge made to 
the 1981 law regarding substituted sanctions, requiring parity 
between the defendant and the prosecutor at each stage of crimi-
144 Corte cost., Apr. 18, 1990, n.183 (regarding the transformation from giudizio 
direttissimo to giudizio abbreviatol. 
I" "All citizens have equal social standing and are equal before the law without dis-
tinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, or social or personal conditions." 
COST. art. 3(1). 
146 Corte cost., Feb. 8, 1990, n.66, 36 Giur. cost. (1991). 
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nal proceedings.147 While the Constitutional Court rejected this 
challenge to the 1981 law, the court found a constitutional viola-
tion as to giudizio abbreviato. Under the 1981 law, the 
prosecutor's withholding of consent could only preclude employ-
ment of the trial-avoidance device. Upon issuing a sentence of 
conviction at the conclusion of the trial, the court could nonethe-
less decide that an alternative sanction was appropriate and 
impose such a punishment. In contrast, the statutory scheme for 
giudizio abbreviato provided for no such recoupment of the re-
duced sentence, thus putting the prosecutor in a position of supe-
riority over that of the defendant, not due to the procedural 
choice, but rather to the ultimate effect this would have on the 
defendant's punishment if convicted. The court rejected argu-
ments by the Avvocatura della Stato148 in defense of the code 
provisions that permitting judicial review of the prosecutor's 
decision not to dispose of the case by the summary procedure 
would amount to attributing powers to the judge which the draft-
ers of the new code intended to deny. This argument is based on 
the idea that a salient aspect of the 1989 Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure is the shift in control over the proceedings from the judge 
to the parties, as an integral characteristic of an accusatory 
system. The argument continues that the provisions for review of 
the prosecutor's choice concerning application of the agreed-upon 
sentence is necessary because the prosecutor's failure to consent 
affects the merits of the case, that is, the qualification of the 
crime involved as well as an evaluation of the aggravating and 
extenuating circumstances. In contrast, the prosecutor's Ghoice 
not to proceed by giudizio abbreviato has nothing to do with the 
merits of the case, but simply indicates the procedural strategy 
of the prosecutor. Again, for the Constitutional Court, the effect 
of the choice on the ultimate sentence was sufficient to require 
'47 Corte cost., Apr. 18, 1990, n.183. 
'4. Essentially, this person is the equivalent of the Attorney General in the United 
States. 
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judicial review and the possibility of recouping the sentence reduction. 
The second aspect of equality the court relied on was the fact 
that similarly-situated defendants could receive markedly differ-
ent sentences depending solely upon the unreviewable decision of 
the prosecutor to agree to giudizio abbreviato in one case and not 
the other. Although not discussed by the court, this holding is 
consistent with Italian distrust of broad prosecutorial discretion 
that could have arbitrary, inconsistent, and unpredictable re-
sults. The mere possibility that similarly-situated defendants 
could receive different sentences probably would not have been 
sufficient to trigger a constitutional violation, but where this pos-
sibility is attributable to an unreviewable decision by the prose-
cutor, the equality provision is a greater concern. 
While the court found the above constitutional violation, the 
court rejected other challenges to giudizio abbreviato which re-
lied on other provisions of the constitution in the same vein as 
the article three equality challenge. By reading into the statuto-
ry provisions the form of review discussed above, the court re-
jected other challenges based on the roles of the judge and prose-
cutor, similar to challenges made to both the 1981 substituted 
sanction law and the device of application of the agreed-upon 
sentence of the parties. 
The Constitutional Court's analysis of these trial-avoidance 
techniques illustrates the tensions and conflicts which these 
devices generate between Italy's fundamental value of ascertain-
ing the substantive truth in criminal matters and the practical 
concern of relieving the clogged system. More specifically, these 
procedures have required a greater definition of the roles of the 
judges and prosecutors, and a refinement of the notion of equali-
ty between the defendant and the prosecutor. 
C. Comparison to Plea Bargaining in the United States 
As previously discussed, before the 1981 and 1989 legialation, 
Italy relieved its overburdened criminal justice system by grant-
ing occasional amnesties. The practice of plea bargaining in the 
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United States similarly began without a foundation in a legisla-
tive choice after deliberation on its advantages and disadvantag-
es. In fact, commentators have described plea bargaining as the 
result of ''backroom deals"149 and as part of an "invisible justice 
system.,,150 By the time any branch of the government was 
called upon to regulate it, the practice had become routine and 
heavily relied upon by both prosecutors and defense attorneys. 
Scholars disagree as to how long plea bargaining has been 
around, with some claiming that the practice has always been a 
part of criminal justice and others tracing its beginnings as re-
cent as the middle of the nineteenth century.15I Regardless of 
when and how plea bargaining originated, no one disputes that 
it is the method by which the vast majority of criminal cases are 
disposed of and that it is here to stay. This part of this Article 
will not describe all or even most aspects of plea bargaining in 
the United States, but will focus instead on issues raised by the 
practice that are similar to the problems faced by the Italian 
system. Comparison should lead to a better understanding of the 
nature of plea bargaining and provide some direction to current 
trends and reform movements in both countries. Of course, any 
discussion of plea bargaining in the United States cannot as-
sume only one system, insofar as each state, as well as the feder-
al system, has its own method, perhaps codified, perhaps not, of 
evaluating plea bargains. Therefore, when comparing the Italian 
mechanisms to plea bargaining in the United States, this article 
will speak in general terms. 
Plea bargaining has been defined as "the exchange of official 
concessions for a defendant's act of self-conviction,,,152 and, less 
cynically, as the "give-and-take negotiation between the prosecu-
149 PiZZI & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 17. 
IIiO BURTON ATKlNS & MARK POGREBIN, Introduction: Discretionary Declslon.Makmg 
m the AdmmlStration of Justice, m THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE 
LAw 1, 4 (Burton AtkIns & Mark Pogrebm eds., 1978). 
151 For one detailed hlstoncal account, see Alschuler, supra note 24. See also, J.M. 
BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 336 (1986) ("There was no plea bargammg 
m felony cases m the eIghteenth century."); George Fisher, The Birth of the Pnson Retold, 
104 YALE L.J. 1235 (1995). 
"2 Alschuler, Plea Bargammg, supra note 24, at 3. 
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tion and defense, which [sic] arguably possess relatively equal 
bargaining power.,,153 At the center of plea bargaining is the 
defendant's admission of guilt and waiver of a jury trial/54 as 
well as other important rights. In exchange, the prosecutor 
might promise one or more of the following: to drop certain 
charges against the defendant, to reduce the offense charged to a 
less serious offense, to make a certain sentencing recommenda-
tion, or not to oppose a sentence requested by the defendant. 155 
Though the prosecutor might promise a certain sentence to be 
imposed, that promise generally is not binding on the judge. 
Nonetheless, only rarely does a judge reject the bargained sen-
tence. In contrast, the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure does 
not require that the defendant admit guilt, (perhaps more analo-
gous to a plea of nolo contendere in the United States), but pro-
vides a statutorily prescribed one-third sentence reduction for 
exercising such an option. Further, since the Code of Criminal 
Procedure specifically provides for one-third sentence reduction, 
the parties engage in little bargaining directly. Given the limits 
on prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors in Italy cannot agree not 
to pursue certain charges against the defendant. Reduction of 
charges is limited to situations where the provision of the penal 
code includes a separate sentence range for a less serious form of 
the same offense. In such a situation, the prosecutor might agree 
with the defense attorney that the particular facts of the case 
make the offense less serious. This is somewhat similar to 
"charge bargaining," but is best viewed as limited to instances 
where the Italian Penal Code, within the same article, defines 
the crime charged and includes a different, and lower, sentencing 
provision for the same crime where extenuating circumstances 
exist. Thus, depending on how a particular offense is set out in 
the penal code, the prosecutor and defense attorney may have a 
little more flexibility in "negotiating" the defendant's sen-
tence. 156 This flexibility is limited, however, to the types of situ-
15.1 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978). 
1M John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & 
SOC'y REV. 261, 262-70 (1979). 
I" See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(1). 
".. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing example of receipt of stolen 
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ations outlined because an Italian prosecutor does not have the 
discretion to charge the most serious offense in one article of the 
penal code and then bargain down to a lesser offense under an-
other article. 
Judicial interpretations of both the Italian device of party-
agreed sentences and U.S. plea bargaining are rather emphatic 
that neither the prosecutor nor the parties can bind the judge's 
decision on sentencing. In Italy, this is true because the constitu-
tion distinguishes between judicial and prosecutorial roles and 
powers within the magistrate.157 In the United States, it is due 
to the doctrine of separation of powers, which similarly dictates 
that the prosecutor is a figure of the executive branch, whose 
responsibility is to enforce laws, while the judiciary is responsi-
ble for sentencing.158 However, under both systems, as a practi-
cal matter, if judges do not accept-the sentences prosecutors have 
promised, defendants will be discouraged from exercising this 
option for disposing of charges against them. The Italian Code of 
Criminal Procedure specifies that the judge must either accept or 
reject the entire agreement of the parties.159 This all-or-nothing 
approach, along with the fact that the defendant's agreement 
with the prosecutor does not include any admission of guilt, 
ensures that the defendant does not risk a prejudicial increase in 
sentence by the judge based on the mere fact that the defendant 
requested this procedure but the request was not granted. In 
contrast, the United States Supreme Court has upheld a bar-
gained sentence where a defendant claimed to have admitted 
guilt solely due to the fear of facing a much more severe sen-
tence, including the death penalty, if convicted at trial.160 And 
more recently, the Supreme Court has held that statements 
goods). 
Ir.7 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
I'" U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be'vested in a 
Congress of the United States."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) 
(holding that Congress' creation of the Sentencing Commission did not violate the sep-
aration of powers doctrine). 
1119 C.P.P. art. 444(3). 
160 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 758 (1970). 
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made by a defendant during unsuccessful plea negotiations may 
be used to impeach the defendant at trial. 161 The effect of both 
these aspects of plea bargaining is to encourage this method of 
resolving criminal cases in the United States. 
III. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
While the trial-avoidance devices of Italy were generally in-
tended to mimic aspects of plea bargaining in the United States, 
this article has pointed to a number of distinctions which stem 
primarily from fundamental differences between the two sys-
tems, such as the strict limits on prosecutorial discretion in Ita-
ly. Interestingly, the drafters of the revised Code of Criminal 
Procedure state up front that one of the goals is to include a 
number of aspects of an accusatorial system. These new features 
include trial-avoidance devices, indicating that the drafters be-
lieve that plea bargaining is part of an accusatorial system by 
definition. In fact, there is little scholarly agreement as to 
whether plea bargaining is more accusatorial or more inquisitori-
al. 162 On the one hand, plea bargaining includes the accusatori-
al notion of placing more control over the criminal proceedings in 
the hands of the parties rather than in the judge. On the other 
hand, plea bargaining also involves the consolidation of several 
functions (charging, fact-finding, and sentencing) into one party, 
the prosecutor. Probably the best analysis is that plea bargain-
ing, on a theoretical level, is not characteristic of or endemic to 
either model, but is simply an aberration which grew out of a 
practical necessity, or at least a perceived necessity, to stream-
line the criminal justice system by disposing of a great majority 
of cases without the time and expense of a trial. Certainly, it is 
not necessary to label trial-avoidance mechanisms as indicative 
of either model. Yet this stark utilitarian definition of plea bar-
gaining poses difficulties in resolving the tensions and conflicts 
the device creates between prosecutors and judges. 
161 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
1112 See supra note Ill. 
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Both of the current Italian trial-avoidance devices were sub-
jected to constitutional challenges based on the potential veto 
power of prosecutors who refuse to consent to the defendant's 
request for one of these procedures.163 An analogous challenge 
arose in the context of California's so-called "Three Strikes and 
You're Out"l64 law. In People v. Romero/65 the defendant was 
charged with what would have been his third felony, making him 
eligible for an "indeterminate term of life imprisonment." The 
information charging Romero with possession of 0.13 grams of 
cocaine base also alleged the prior convictions of second degree 
burglary, attempted burglary, first degree'burglary and two con-
victions based on possession of a controlled substance. Romero 
initially pled not guilty. At a subsequent hearing, the defendant 
changed his plea to guilty after the judge offered to strike the 
prior convictions, subjecting Romero to a sentence from one to 
six years. The prosecutor objected, arguing that the court could 
not on its own dismiss prior felony convictions without the 
prosecutor's consent. The judge nonetheless accepted the guilty 
plea, struck the prior felony allegations from the record, and 
sentenced Romero to six years imprisonment. Before the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the defendant argued that requiring the 
prosecutor's assent to striking the prior felonies would violate 
the separation of powers doctrine166 by giving the prosecutor a 
veto power over a court's decision to dismiss. The California 
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's authority to dismiss prior 
felonies sua sponte. The court's approach focused on the power to 
dispose of properly filed criminal charges as a judicial function 
and found that requiring the prosecutor's approval of such judi-
cial action would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 
This analysis is analogous to the Italian Constitutional Court's 
analysis of the prosecutor's role in the trial-avoidance procedures 
under the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure. Where a prosecutor 
in Italy refuses to consent to one of the mechanisms discussed 
,1<1 See supra text accompanying notes 66, 143. 
, .. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 1997). 
,6., 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). 
166 CAL. CONST .. art. III, § 3 .. 
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above, the concern is with giving the prosecutor a veto power, 
effectively binding the judge's sentencing decision. However, the 
Italian Constitutional Court's resolution of this conflict between 
the judge and prosecutor did not promote the goal of resolving 
cases without a trial. Rather, the prosecutor's refusal to consent 
blocks the use of the trial-avoidance mechanism, thereby requir-
ing a trial. In contrast, the Romero holding furthers the disposi-
tion of cases without trial, even where this means that the goal 
of the "Three Strikes" legislation is frustrated because a 
"threepeat" offender will not serve an indeterminate life sen-
tence. 
Another example of the tensions between the roles of judges 
and prosecutors relates to sentencing guidelines. 167 Commenta-
tors claim that such guidelines take the traditionally judicial 
task of sentencing away from judges and place it in the hands of 
prosecutors. 16B Specifically, by setting out severe mandatory 
minimum sentences, narrowly defining appropriate situations for 
departures, and leaving untouched the broad charging discretion 
and the practice of plea negotiating, the guidelines give prosecu-
tors a great deal of leverage in plea negotiations with defen-
dants. 169 If convicted, the defendant faces a certain and much 
stiffer sentence with little possibility of parole under sentencing 
guidelines. 17o The parallel criticism of sentencing guidelines is 
that they "turn thinking and feeling judges into robotic com put-
'67 By 1994, all 50 states and the federal government had adopted mandatory sen-
tencing laws. Dale Parent et aI., Key Legislative Issues in Criminal Justice: Mandatory 
Sentencing, Research in Action 1 (U.S. Dept. Of Justice!Nat'l Inst. Justice Nov. 1996). 
''''' Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggre· 
gation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) ("The sentencing reform movement has not re-
stricted sentencing discretion so much as it has transferred discretion from judges to 
prosecutors.~). 
,.. Id.; Thomas R. Burton, Enraged Over Punishment: One Judge's Call for Sentencing 
Reform, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 167, 177 (1996) (reviewing LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO 
PUNISH (W.W. Norton & Co. 1994»; Misner, supra note 25, at 756 (arguing that sentenc-
ing guidelines have increased the substantial amount of discretion which prosecutors al-
ready have); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1993) ("[C]ontrol over the charge is ... control of the sentence."). 
'70 Burton, supra note 168, at 177-78. 
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ers"l7l who must calculate the upward and downward depar-
tures mathematically. Within the context of plea bargaining, the 
effect of sentencing guidelines is to substantially increase the 
power and leverage of the prosecutor in whom the functions of 
charging, fact-finding and sentencing are already collapsed, 
while concomitantly diminishing the role of the judge to that of a 
mere rubber-stamper. 
As discussed earlier, there is a similar concern in Italy that 
the judge's role is inappropriately reduced to that of a notary 
under the trial-avoidance procedure of a party-agreed sentence. 
Subsequent sentences of the Italian Constitutional Court achieve 
a slightly better balance between these tensions by holding that 
judges are still required to explain in writing their reasons for 
accepting the proposed agreement of the parties. More important 
is the fact that prosecutors in Italy do not have the broad charg-
ing discretion that prosecutors in the United States have. This 
narrow charging discretion, coupled with the 1989 Code's divi-
sion of functions between the prosecutor and judge, have the 
effect of avoiding the collapse of roles into one player. This is 
especially important in Italy where a significant result of the 
1989 Code was to eliminate the role of the investigative judge 
and give the prosecutor more of a role in the system as a party. 
Therefore, while Italy has eliminated the monocratic and largely 
unchecked power of the investigative judge, the United States 
has enhanced the similarly unchecked power of a different play-
er-the prosecutor-while still treating the prosecutor primarily 
as an adversarial party. Once again, resolution of such tensions 
in the United States results in the increased ability to dispose of 
cases without trial, in contrast to that in Italy which results in 
barriers to the avoidance of trial. 
A final example of the tensions regarding the role of the prose-
cutor in the United States is where the defendant opts for a 
judge trial. Of course, where a defendant pleads gmlty to a crim-
inal charge, a jury trial is no longer necessary, but a defendant 
171 Harvey A. SHvergiate, Sentencing Guidelines, 37 BOSTON·B.J. 17 (1993). 
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might waive the constitutional right to a jury trial without ad-
mitting guilt and opt for a bench trial. The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has held that a defendant does not have 
a correlative right to a bench trial in such a situation.172 Thus, 
the requirement under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
that the prosecutor and the judge consent to a judge trial173 
does not violate the constitution.174 In addition, the Court held 
that, given the government attorney's role as a "servant of the 
law,,175 and the Court's "confidence in the integrity of the feder-
al prosecutor,,,176 the prosecutor need not articulate reasons for 
withholding consent to the defendant's waiver of a jury trial. 
This analysis makes it difficult for a defendant to challenge the 
prosecutor's refusal to dispose of the case by a judge trial. The 
deference to the prosecutor's integrity and discretion in this 
situation is significant to this comparison of mechanisms for 
streamlining the criminal justice systems in Italy and the United 
States because one potential advantage of a judge trial is that 
the defendant might be subjected to a less severe sentence based 
on the savings in judicial resources. I77 Certainly, scholars have 
noted that such a perception exists. 178 Therefore, although 
there is no specific statutory basis for reducing the sentence of a 
defendant who has foregone a trial by jury, like there is in Italy, 
there exists at least this possibility of a reduced sentence. Yet, 
the largely unreviewable power of the prosecutor to refuse to 
consent to the defendant's request could deprive the defendant of 
such a sentencing benefit. As discussed earlier, the Italian Con-
stitutional Court has determined that while the prosecutor can 
block the use of an abbreviated procedure, a prosecutor's improp-
er dissent cannot deny the defendant the benefits of the statuto-
172 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965). 
17.1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). 
174 Interestingly, in the context of court-martials the prosecutor's consent is not neces-
sary for a bench trial. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Rule for Courts-Martial 
[R.C.M.J 903(c)(2) (1995). 
m Singer, 380 U.S. at 37 (quoting. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935». 
17. Id. 
177 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 37 n.187 (quoting Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is 
Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1037, 1051 (1984». 
'" Id. 
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ry one-third sentence reduction. Thus, subjecting the prosecutor's 
refusal to consent to judicial review is a type of "check" typical of 
the accusatorial model of criminal justice. 
More interesting, however, is that the Supreme Court in Sing-
er based its determination that the prosecutor need not articu-
late reasons for refusing to consent on the notion that the prose-
cutor "is not an ordinary party to a controversy, but a 'servant of 
the law' with a 'twofold aim . . . that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer.",179 This description of the prosecutor as an 
impartial party to the case hints of aspects of an inquisitorial 
system and raises the question of the proper conception of the 
prosecutor's role. The criminal justice system in the United 
States is an adversarial model which emphasizes the importance 
and control of the parties, yet a prosecutor also has the "respon:' 
sibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advo-
cate.'H80 Analogously, in Italy prosecutors and judges come un-
der the umbrella title of Magistrati (magistrates).181 Even after 
adoption of the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor 
and judge both continue to be considered members of the judicial 
branch, in contrast to a prosecutor in the United States who is 
separate from the judge, and an arm of the executive branch. 
The blurring of the prosecutor's role in the language and reason-
ing used by the Court in Singer is inconsistent with the fact that 
the prosecutor is not a member of the judicial branch. Similarly, 
implementing a criminal justice system which emphasizes the 
adversarial role of the parties, where one of the parties, the 
prosecutor, is a magistrate, has given rise to the same types of 
tensions in Italy. The concern is framed in terms of the appear-
ance of impropriety of a player who should be an adversary 
against the defendant, yet forms part of the branch of the gov-
ernment which is to be impartial in deciding the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. 
\79 Singer, 380 U.S. at 37 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935». 
1110 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1995). 
1"1 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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Recently, an Italian senator proposed a law which would sepa-
rate the careers of judges and prosecutors. 182 If passed, prose-
cutors would no longer come under the umbrella title of 
magistrati and would have to pursue a different career path and 
pass different entrance exams than judges. Just as the drafters 
of the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure looked to the United 
States, this proposed law was inspired by the aspect of criminal 
justice in the United States which does not place the prosecutor 
within the judicial branch of the government. One common com-
plaint of Italian defense attorneys is that under the current 
system an individual who has served as a prosecutor (on one side 
of the bench) might suddenly become a judge and serve on the 
other side of the bench. This is especially troubling now that the 
1989 Code of Criminal Procedure has placed prosecutors in the 
role of advocates. Where one comes to the bench with the back-
ground of having acted as an advocate for the state in prosecut-
ing criminal defendants, the fear is that this person will neces-
sarily be biased against criminal defendants. In the United 
States, however, many judges come to the bench with lengthy 
experience as prosecutors or criminal defense attorneys since it 
is rare for graduating law students to directly pursue a judge-
ship. Perhaps Italy should consider flexible provisions which 
would give criminal defense attorneys a more realistic opportuni-
ty of becoming judges after a career in defense work. Currently, 
a person must be under the age of 35 to qualify for the examina-
tions for magistrati. Typically, those who have gone into criminal 
defense work are too early in their careers to consider a change. 
The possibility of eliminating such an age restriction and open-
ing up the judiciary to defense attorneys might be less offensive 
than depriving prosecutors of their status, and might avoid the 
politically charged question of whether prosecutors would then 
become a completely independent and autonomous branch of the 
government or, conversely, dependent upon the executive. 183 
'"2 Disegno di legge, Sept. 30, 1996, n. 1383. 
11<:< This issue is not as politically charged in Italy because there, as well as in other 
civil law countries, state power is viewed with a greater degree of trust than in the Unit-
ed States. William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: 
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One scholar has already cautioned against calls for reform of 
the prosecutor's role in the United States based on examples 
from civil law countries, mainly because the cultural, historical 
and political differences pose formidable barriers to the effective-
ness of such reforms. lM Similarly, attempts to reform the role 
of prosecutors in Italy should be approached with caution. Such 
caution is not based solely on the fact that the traditions and 
cultures of the countries are different and that these differences 
are reflected in the prosecutor's role, but is based on a more 
practical level. That is, were Italy to separate prosecutors from 
the judicial branch, ethical responsibilities would nonetheless 
curb the potential for a passionately adversarial prosecutory role 
and, thus, not avoid the tension of conflicting roles the 1989 
Code of Criminal Procedure places on prosecutors. The Italian 
Code of Ethics requires magistrati and also, specifically, 
prosecutors, to act impartially, to direct their investigations to-
ward determining the truth, to acquire evidence favorable to the 
defendant, and not to keep such evidence from the judge.ls5 
This consideration of the duties and roles of the prosecutor is 
important in the context of the trial-avoidance procedures of the 
1989 Code of Criminal Procedure because the creation of an 
independent branch of prosecutors, as well as any expansion of 
the use of trial-avoidance procedures, could eventually lead to 
greatly increased prosecutorial discretion. This author cautions 
Italian lawmakers to avoid the replacement of one monocratic 
and largely autonomous player, the investigative judge, by an-
other, the prosecutor. 
The historic mixture of adversarial and nonadversarial char-
acteristics implemented by the 1989 Italian Code of Criminal 
Procedure are reflective of that country's concern with the impo-
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1325, 1338 (1993). 
II« Id. at 1373. 
1M CODICE ETICO [C.E.] art. 13 (addressing the "conduct of the public prosecutor") in 
Eraldo Stefani, L'ACCERTAl\1ENTO DELLA VERITA IN DIBA'ITIMENTO [Ascertainment of 
Truth at Trial] app. at 261 (1995). See also Stefani, supra note 42, at 34 (noting the con-
flicting roles and duties imposed upon the prosecutor). 
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sition of checks on abuses of power by dividing the functions of 
the players and the phases of the disposition of a criminal case. 
In order to ensure justice, though perhaps not the discovery of 
substantive truth, such checks need to be present even in the 
disposition of cases without trial. In the United States, due to 
the broad discretion of the prosecutors, limits and checks are 
easily circumvented,186 thus making it extremely difficult to 
"tame the dragon.,,187 However, where Italy has taken small 
and tentative steps toward trial-avoidance procedures it might be 
possible to add gradually to the powers of prosecutors allowing 
for an evaluation each step of the way. At the same time, howev-
er, restrained broadening of trial-avoidance procedures is likely 
to impede rapid relief from case backlog in Italy. Thus, it seems 
that despite the serious need for quick disposition of cases,188 it 
is unlikely that Italian criminal courts will see much decrease in 
caseloads. Nonetheless, this cautious approach to reform in order 
to ensure that checks on the process are maintained may well 
lead to other types of proposals which do not focus only on the 
role of the judge or prosecutor or on the ability to dispose of 
cases without trial. For example, commentators have suggested 
decriminalizing some activities currently defined as crimes. 189 
CONCLUSION 
While Italian lawmakers struggle with the tensions between 
the traditional purpose of a criminal justice system to determine 
the truth and the need to dispose of cases efficiently, they should 
look carefully at the current trends in the United States and see 
the potential dangers of consolidating tremendous power in the 
prosecutor. They should view the beginnings of incremental re-
form as an opportunity to maintain control and to consider an 
''''' See supra note 29 for citations to evaluations of various attempts to curb plea 
bargaining. 
'"' See, e.g., Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Admin-
istratiue Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473 (1976). 
,M Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 48, at 6. 
,"4 TIZIANA TREVISSON LUPACCHINI, NATURA ED EFFE'ITI DELLA SENTENZA CHE 
APPLICA LA PENA SU RICHIESTA DELLE PARTI (1996). 
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array of possible approaches. In fact, the variety of expediting 
procedures under the 1989 Code are indicative of their creative 
abilities.190 Thus, it may be that Italy will eventually answer 
the question of whether plea bargaining is inevitable191 in crim-
inal justice systems reflective of liberal democratic ideals in the 
negative, and refuse to accept the widespread use of plea bar-
gaining as it currently exists in the United States. 
190 See supra note 92. 
191 See Schulhofer, supra note 177, at 1037 (challenging ide~ that plea bargaining is 
unavoidable in the United States). 
